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The Control by and Rights of the  
Data Subject Under the GDPR
By P.T.J. Wolters
INTRODUCTION
The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) creates several obligations for “control-
lers” and “processors” of “personal data.”1 The regu-
lation replaced the “Data Protection Directive” and 
its national implementations on May 25, 2018.2 It 
has been adopted to strengthen the protection of 
personal data.3 However, it will only lead to this 
result if the controllers and processors comply with 
their obligations. Under both the Data Protection 
Directive and the GDPR, enforcement largely 
depends on the national supervisory authorities. 
In practice, this supervision does not guarantee an 
effective protection of personal data.4 The GDPR 
empowers the “data subject” in order to improve 
this protection. It creates and strengthens several 
rights that grant him control over the “processing” 
of his personal data.5 This control allows him to 
better decide who is authorized to process his data 
and the purposes for which this is permitted.6
In this article, I will give an overview of these 
rights and analyze the extent to which the GDPR 
truly strengthens the control by the data subject. I 
will answer the following research questions: What 
are the rights of the data subject under the GDPR? To 
what extent do these rights strengthen the control over 
the processing of his personal data? This article pro-
ceeds as follows. Section “The position of the data 
subject” describes the disadvantaged position that 
limits the control by the data subject. Next, sec-
tions “The right of access” through “Modalities in 
relation to the exercise of the rights of the data sub-
ject” give an overview of his rights and the rules in 
relation to the exercise of these rights. This over-
view contains a comparison between the GDPR 
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and the Data Protection Directive. I subsequently 
analyze the extent to which the GDPR strengthens 
the rights and the control by the data subject (sec-
tion “Synthesis”). The article ends with a conclusion. 
Although the GDPR enhances the rights, it only 
leads to a limited strengthening of the control by the 
data subject (section “Conclusion”).
The scope of this article is limited in several 
ways. First, a controller has several obligations that 
exist independently of any action by the data subject. 
These duties create rights for the data subject. Indeed, 
he can enforce them pursuant to Article 79 of the 
GDPR. These rights and obligations are not covered 
in this article. For example, I do not discuss the “right 
to information at the collection of personal data” or 
the “right to data protection by default”.7 Instead, the 
article is limited to the rights contained in chapter III 
of the GDPR that only create legal obligations for the 
controller if the data subject actively chooses to exer-
cise them. Furthermore, the discussion of the rights 
is limited to the aspects that are important for the 
answer to the research questions. An emphasis is put 
on elements that affect the control by the data subject 
and the differences between the GDPR and the Data 
Protection Directive. Finally, the article does not 
cover the limitations of the rights of the data subject 
pursuant to the interests mentioned in the Articles 
23 and 89 of the GDPR and Article 13 of the Data 
Protection Directive.
THE POSITION OF THE  
DATA SUBJECT
The position of the data subject relative to the 
controller is weak. It can be compared with the rela-
tionship between a consumer and a business.8 A con-
troller will usually process personal data in the course 
of its professional activities.9 It processes the data of a 
large group of data subjects10 in a standardized manner 
and has the required financial means, organizational 
capacity, and technical expertise. In contrast, the 
personal data of a single data subject are processed by 
many controllers and in many different ways.11 A data 
subject is not practically able to maintain an over-
view of these controllers and processing operations.12 
Furthermore, it can be difficult to establish the 
exact consequences of individual operations.13 Many 
Europeans feel that they have insufficient control 
over their personal data.14
The rights are aimed at improving the control by 
and the position of the data subject. However, this dis-
advantaged position can prevent him from effectively 
exercising his rights.15 For example, a data subject will 
not benefit from his right of access if he does not know 
the parties that might process his personal data or if 
he cannot value the provided information.16 The right 
to data portability will not improve his protection if 
the competitors of the controller process the personal 
data in the same manner.17 Furthermore, a violation 
of the GDPR frequently affects a large number of data 
subjects or even society as a whole. The enforcement 
through individual rights is at odds with this “collec-
tive nature” of data protection.18
In this respect, data protection law is different 
from consumer law. A consumer that is faced with 
unfair contractual terms or goods that are not in con-
formity with the contract of sale might not know his 
legal rights. However, he will at least know that he 
is adversely affected. For example, the consumer will 
know that he is stuck with an unwanted subscrip-
tion or a broken telephone. This can induce him to 
look into his legal rights. In contrast, such a stimu-
lus is absent if the data subject does not know that a 
bank is using incorrect personal data to deny a loan 
application without human intervention or if he does 
not know that these data are acquired from another 
controller that should have deleted the information a 
long time ago.19
RIGHT OF ACCESS
Pursuant to Article 15 of the GDPR, a data sub-
ject has the right to obtain from the controller confir-
mation as to whether or not his personal data are being 
processed. Article 15(3) grants the data subject the 
right to a copy of the processed data. Furthermore, the 
controller is obligated to provide information about 
this data and the processing operations. Pursuant to 
Article 12(1), this information should be presented in 
a concise, transparent, intelligible, and easily acces-
sible form, using clear and plain language.
The right of access is a logical first step toward 
the exercise of the other rights. For example, a 
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data subject cannot effectively request a correction 
if he does not know what personal data are incor-
rect. For this reason, the provided information 
should enable the data subject to become aware of 
the data, to check that they are accurate and pro-
cessed lawfully and to exercise his other rights.20 
However, the other rights are not limited to data 
subjects that have exercised their right of access.21 
The data subjects can also exercise them if they 
become aware of the processing in another way. 
For example, if an insurance agent informs a cus-
tomer that his insurance becomes more expensive 
because he has caused several accidents, the data 
subject does not need to use his right of access to 
know what data are processed and whether or not 
they are correct. In these situations, the data sub-
ject is not obligated to exercise his right of access, 
and wait for the controller to respond, before utiliz-
ing his other rights.
The right of access is also granted by Article 
12(a) of the Data Protection Directive. However, a 
controller is obligated to provide more information 
under the GDPR.22 For example, he has to inform the 
data subject about the envisaged retention period or 
the criteria to determine that period. The additional 
information also relates to the other rights of the data 
subject. Under the Data Protection Directive, the 
controller had to inform the subject about the logic 
involved in any automatic processing of personal data. 
Pursuant to Article 15(1)(h) of the GDPR, this infor-
mation has to be meaningful. Furthermore, it is sup-
plemented by information about the significance and 
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the 
data subject. Finally, the controller has to inform the 
data subject about his other rights and the possibil-
ity to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority 
pursuant to Article 15(1)(e) and (f). This informa-
tion does not have to be provided under the Data 
Protection Directive.
The additional information allows a data subject 
to make a decision about the exercise of his rights 
based on concrete information about existing process-
ing operations instead of an abstract privacy statement 
at the time of the collection of the data.23 Specifically, 
the information about retention periods and auto-
matic processing facilitates the exercise of the right 
to be forgotten and the right to obtain human inter-
vention. Moreover, the additional obligations ensure 
that a data subject is again (section “Information and 
communication”) made aware of the existence of his 
rights.
RIGHT TO RECTIFICATION  
AND COMPLETION
Pursuant to Article 16 of the GDPR, a data sub-
ject has the right to obtain from the controller the 
rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning 
him. He also has the right to complete the data if 
they are incomplete in the light of the purposes of 
the processing. Article 19 obligates the controller 
to communicate the rectification or completion24 to 
the recipients to whom the personal data have been 
disclosed. This duty does not apply if the commu-
nication is impossible or would involve dispropor-
tionate effort. Finally, the data subject has a right to 
information about the recipients.25 This allows him 
to make sure that these recipients also use the cor-
rect data.
The right to rectification is also granted by Article 
12(b) and (c) of the Data Protection Directive. The 
right to completion is not mentioned explicitly. 
However, like the GDPR,26 the directive treats the 
right to completion as a part of the right to rectifica-
tion. Article 12(b) states that the right to rectification 
exists if the processing does not comply with the pro-
visions of the Data Protection Directive, in particular 
because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the 
data. Naturally, incomplete data can be “rectified” by 
completing it. Furthermore, the principle of accuracy 
formulated in Article 6(d) imposes a general duty to 
make sure that the data are accurate and complete. 
For this reason, the limitation to situations in which a 
processing does not comply with the Data Protection 
Directive is also of little consequence.
RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Pursuant to Article 17 of the GDPR, a data sub-
ject has a right to obtain from the controller the era-
sure of personal data concerning him. If the controller 
has made the data public, Article 17(2) obligates him 
to take reasonable steps to inform other controllers of 
the request to erase the personal data. Furthermore, 
Article 19 of the GDPR imposes a duty on the con-
troller to communicate the erasure to the recipients 
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to whom the personal data have been disclosed (see 
also section “Right to rectification and completion”). 
Article 17(1) lists the grounds that grant the right to 
erasure. The right does not apply if the processing is 
necessary for the purposes listed in paragraph 3.
Article 17 of the GDPR does not only state that a 
data subject has the right to be forgotten in the listed 
situations. It also states that the controller has an obli-
gation to erase the data under the same conditions. 
This wording suggests that this duty can also apply if 
the data subject does not actively exercise his right. 
Other articles of the GDPR impose a similar obliga-
tion to erase personal data. Pursuant to the Articles 
5(1)(c) and (e) and (2), 24 and 25, the controller is 
responsible for the compliance with the principles of 
data minimisation and storage limitation. In particu-
lar, he is obligated to establish the periods in which 
the personal data are stored and the criteria that 
determine this period.27
This interpretation of Article 17 is tenable if the 
personal data have to be erased for compliance with a 
legal obligation to which the controller is subject (para-
graph 1 under e) or if the data subject takes another 
action against the processing, in particular by with-
drawing his consent (under b) or by objecting to the 
processing (under c). However, this interpretation is 
problematic in the other situations listed in paragraph 1. 
In many cases, an unlawful processing (under d) 
can also be mended without erasing the personal data 
(see below section “Right to restriction of process-
ing”). The erasure is not preferable if the data sub-
ject does not object to the further lawful processing 
of his data. The mere fact that the personal data have 
been collected in relation to the offer of information 
society services to a child (under f) does not justify 
the deletion of the data. After all, Article 8(1) of the 
GDPR formulates criteria under which the processing 
of this data is permissible.
For these reasons, the interpretation that the right 
to be forgotten creates a general obligation to erase 
the personal data even when the data subject does not 
actively exercise his right should be rejected.28 There 
is space between the right of the data subject to obtain 
erasure pursuant to Article 17 and the obligation of 
the controller to erase the personal date pursuant to 
other clauses of the GDPR. For example, it is possible 
that a controller has fixed storage periods that comply 
with Article 25(2), while an individual data subject 
still has the right to obtain erasure pursuant to Article 
17(1)(a) because the personal data are no longer nec-
essary in relation to the purposes for which they were 
collected or processed.
The right to be forgotten is also granted by Article 
12(b) and (c) of the Data Protection Directive.29 
Under the directive, the right applies if the processing 
of the personal data does not comply with the pro-
visions of the Data Protection Directive. The GDPR 
provides a more detailed description of the situations 
in which the right can be exercised. However, the 
scope remains largely the same. For example, if the 
controller has a legal obligation to erase the personal 
data (Article 17, paragraph 1 under e of the GDPR) or 
is no longer allowed to process it because the data sub-
ject withdraws his consent (under b) or successfully 
objects to the processing (under c), the further pro-
cessing of the personal data, including the storage,30 
would not comply with the Data Protection Directive 
or the GDPR. Similarly, the processing of personal 
data that are no longer necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they were collected or otherwise 
processed (under a) would violate the principles of 
purpose limitation and data minimisation and would 
thus be unlawful (under d).31 However, the Data 
Protection Directive does not grant a right to be for-
gotten for personal data that are collected in relation 
to the offer of information society services to a child 
(under f).32 By expanding the right to be forgotten to 
this ground, the GDPR slightly broadens the scope.
RIGHT TO RESTRICTION  
OF PROCESSING
Pursuant to Article 18 of the GDPR, a data sub-
ject has the right to obtain from the controller the 
restriction of the processing of his personal data. If the 
data subject exercises his right, the controller shall 
only process the data with the subject’s consent, for 
the establishment, exercise, or defence of legal claims, 
for the protection of the rights of another natural or 
legal person or for reasons of important public interest. 
Furthermore, the controller remains allowed to store 
the personal data. After all, the erasure of the personal 
data would also be a processing operation pursuant to 
Article 4(2) of the GDPR. Paragraph 3 obligates the 
controller to inform the data subject before lifting the 
restriction. Again, Article 19 of the GDPR imposes a 
duty on the controller to communicate the restriction 
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to the recipients to whom the personal data have been 
disclosed (see also section “Right to rectification and 
completion”)
Article 18(1) lists the grounds under which the 
right to the restriction of processing exists. First, the 
right can be a temporary solution when there is a con-
flict about the accuracy of the personal data (under 
a, section “Right to rectification and completion”) or 
about the exercise of the right to object (under d, sec-
tion “Right to object”). Next, the right to restriction 
of processing can be an alternative for the erasure of 
the personal data if the data subject needs them in 
relation to a legal claim (under c) or opposes the era-
sure of unlawfully processed data for another reason 
(under b, see also section “Right to be forgotten).
In addition to the rights to rectification and 
completion and to be forgotten, Article 12(b) and 
(c) of the Data Protection Directive also grants the 
right to “block” the data if the processing does not 
comply with the Data Protection Directive. The right 
to restriction of processing under the GDPR has a 
slightly broader scope. It is expanded to also apply 
during the period between the exercise of a right by 
the data subject and the response by the controller. 
Pursuant to Article 18(1)(a) and (d), it covers the 
periods that enable the controller to verify the accu-
racy of the personal data and to demonstrate legiti-
mate grounds that override the objections of the data 
subject. Under the Data Protection Directive, the 
processing would only not comply with the provisions 
if it is actually established that the data are incorrect 
or incomplete or that the data subject has successfully 
objected to the processing. Furthermore, the GDPR 
clarifies the right by spelling out the consequences of 
the exercise of the right to restriction of processing. 
Finally, it explicitly states which processing opera-
tions remain allowed.
RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY
Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the GDPR, the data 
subject has the right to receive a copy of his personal 
data (section “Right of access”). The right to data 
portability expands this right in several ways.33 First, 
Article 20(1) of the GDPR states that the data subject 
has a right to transmit the data to another control-
ler. Paragraph 2 grants him the right to have the data 
transmitted directly from one controller to another. 
This does not a contrario mean that a data subject can-
not transmit the personal data when the right to data 
portability does not apply. The GDPR assumes that 
a data subject can assert control over “his” data. The 
fact that the information is legitimately processed by 
a controller does not change this.34
Furthermore, Article 20 of the GDPR states that 
the data should be provided in a structured, commonly 
used and machine-readable format. “Structured” 
means that the personal data fit in a data model that 
can be used to define and interpret the data. For exam-
ple, the provided information should allow a computer 
to understand that the text “Pieter Wolters” refers to 
the name of the data subject and that “P.Wolters@jur.
ru.nl” is his email address. This structure allows the 
recipients to use the provided data in their own com-
puter systems. The format should also be “commonly 
used”. However, this does not obligate the controller 
to use a specific format. For this reason, the right to 
data portability does not guarantee that the recipient 
can actually use the data. This is only possible if the 
computer systems of the controller and the recipient 
are interoperable.35
The right to data portability strengthens the 
control by the data subject over his data (section 
“Introduction”). Instead of just influencing the pro-
cessing by existing controllers, it also allows him to 
“transfer” his data to other “new” controllers.36 For 
example, a data subject who wishes to switch from 
Facebook to another social network, or to use another 
social network in addition to Facebook, will not have 
to rebuild his entire profile.
Article 20 of the GDPR restricts the right to data 
portability in several ways. First, the right only applies 
to personal data that have been provided by the data 
subject to the controller. It does not cover data that 
have been created by the controller. However, the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party states that 
the right does not only apply to data that are actively 
and knowingly provided by the data subject. It also 
covers information that is obtained by observing the 
subject.37
Furthermore, the right only exists if the lawful-
ness of the processing is based on the consent of the 
data subject or on the necessity for the performance 
of a contract to which the data subject is a party. It 
does not apply if the processing is based on one of the 
other grounds of Article 6(1) of the GDPR. For exam-
ple, it does not apply if the processing is necessary for 
J u l y  2 0 1 8  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W
11
compliance with a legal obligation or for the perfor-
mance of a task carried out in the public interest.38 
Next, the right to data portability only exists if the 
processing is carried out by “automated means”. This 
concept is not defined in the GDPR. The Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party states that most paper 
files are excluded.39
Finally, Article 20(4) of the GDPR states that the 
right to data portability shall not adversely affect the 
rights and freedoms of others. Such an adverse effect 
could arise when the personal data also concern a third 
party. For example, the information that a data subject 
has received email from a third party, also means that 
the third party has sent this email. In principle, this 
“silent party data” is included in the right to data por-
tability. The lawfulness of the processing of this data 
by the “new” controller can be based on the legitimate 
interest of the controller and the data subject (Article 
6(1)(f) of the GDPR). After all, a data subject cannot 
effectively transfer his email if this information is not 
included. Of course, the new controller can only pro-
cess the silent party data for the purpose of providing a 
service to the data subject. He cannot use the data to 
create a profile about the third party or to approach it 
with commercial offers. For this reason, the processing 
of silent party data does not adversely affect the rights 
and freedoms of the third party.40
The right to data portability is new. It is not 
included in the Data Protection Directive. However, 
the importance of this right should not be overesti-
mated. A data subject can also obtain a copy of his per-
sonal data by exercising his right of access. Although 
the controller has to communicate this information 
in an intelligible form, the Data Protection Directive 
does not obligate him to provide the data in a struc-
tured, commonly used and machine-readable format.
RIGHT TO OBJECT
Pursuant to Article 21 of the GDPR, the data 
subject has the right to object to a processing of his 
personal data. The criteria for this right depend on 
the processing that is objected to. First, paragraph 2 
grants the data subject the right to object at any time 
to the processing of his data for direct marketing pur-
poses. If he exercises this right, the controller is no 
longer allowed to process the data for these purposes 
pursuant to paragraph 3.
Next, paragraph 1 grants the data subject the right 
to object to the processing of his data which is based 
on Article 6(1)(e) or (f) of the GDPR. Contrary to an 
objection against the processing for direct marketing, 
the exercise of this right must be based on grounds 
relating to his particular situation. Furthermore, the 
controller will not always be obligated to stop the pro-
cessing. He can continue if he can demonstrate “com-
pelling legitimate grounds” for the processing that 
override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data 
subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence 
of legal claims (see also section “Right to restriction 
of processing”).
Under the criteria of paragraph 1, the successful 
exercise of the right to object depends on a compari-
son of interests. The interests, rights, and freedoms 
of the data subject that are affected by the process-
ing must be weighed against the performance of the 
task carried out in the public interest or the exercise 
of official authority (Article 6, paragraph 1 under e) 
or the legitimate interests of the controller or a third 
party (under f) that is facilitated by the processing. 
This kind of comparison of interests is also incorpo-
rated in Article 6(1)(f). However, there will again 
(see section “Right to be forgotten”) be space between 
the lawfulness of the processing and the use of the 
right to object. It is possible that the processing of the 
personal data of a group of persons is allowed pursuant 
to Article 6(1)(f), but an individual data subject can 
still successfully object.41
A data subject cannot use his right to object if 
the processing is based on one of the other grounds of 
Article 6(1) of the GDPR. The right cannot be used 
against a processing that is necessary for compliance 
with a legal obligation (under c) or for the protection of 
vital interests (under d). Even if it could be used in these 
situations, the controller would almost certainly be able 
to demonstrate “compelling legitimate grounds” that 
override the interests of the data subject.42 Furthermore, 
a data subject can act against processing operations by 
not entering into or ending contracts that necessitate 
the processing (under b) or by withdrawing his consent 
(under a and Article 7, paragraph 3).
Finally, Article 21(6) grants the data subject the 
right to object to the processing of his personal data 
for scientific or historical research purposes or statisti-
cal purposes pursuant to Article 89(1) of the GDPR. 
Again, the objection must be based on grounds relat-
ing to his particular situation. If this criterium is met, 
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the controller cannot appeal to compelling legitimate 
grounds. However, he can continue to process the 
personal data if the processing is necessary for the per-
formance of a task carried out for reasons of public 
interest. The GDPR does not clarify how this excep-
tion relates to Article 21(1). Paragraph 1 grants the 
right to object against a processing that is based on a 
task carried out in the public interest. However, para-
graph 6 restricts this right if the data are processed 
for both a task of public interest and scientific or his-
torical research purposes or statistical purposes. It does 
not require these grounds to override the interests, 
rights, and freedoms of the data subject.
The right to object is also granted by Article 14 
of the Data Protection Directive. This article does 
not make an explicit exception for the situation that 
the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate 
grounds for the processing that override the inter-
ests of the data subject. However, it does require 
that the data subject bases his objection on compel-
ling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situa-
tion. Furthermore, the controller is only obligated to 
stop processing the data if the objection is “justified”. 
Finally, Article 14 does not create a right to object 
to the processing for scientific or historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes.
RIGHT TO OBTAIN HUMAN 
INTERVENTION
Article 22(1) of the GDPR states that a data sub-
ject has the right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely43 on automated processing or profiling44 which 
produces legal effects concerning him or similarly sig-
nificantly affects him. In reality, this “right” is a pro-
hibition.45 Paragraph 1 does not require any action by 
the data subject.
According to recital 71, Article 22(1) also applies 
to the automatic refusal of an online credit application 
or e-recruiting practices without any human interven-
tion. Indeed, these kinds of decisions significantly 
affect the data subject. However, this does not mean 
that it is never allowed to use profiling to enter into 
(personalized) contracts.46 Pursuant to paragraph 2, 
the prohibition does not apply if the decision is neces-
sary for entering into, or the performance of, a con-
tract between the data subject and the controller 
(under a), is authorized by national or European law 
which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard 
the data subject”s rights, freedoms and legitimate 
interests (under b), or is based on the explicit con-
sent47 of the data subject (under c). Article 22(4) of 
the GDPR creates additional requirements for deci-
sions that are based on the special categories of per-
sonal data referred to in Article 9. However, Article 
9(2)(a) determines that these data can also be pro-
cessed if the data subject has given explicit consent.
If the exception of Article 22(2)(a) or (c) applies, 
paragraph 3 obligates the controller to implement suit-
able measures to safeguard the data subject”s rights, 
freedoms, and legitimate interests. He must take steps 
to prevent mistakes and discriminating effects.48 The 
data subject should at least have the right to obtain 
human intervention, to express his point of view and 
to contest the decision. If the data subject exercises 
these rights, the controller is obligated to make a new 
decision that is not solely based on automated process-
ing.49 Instead, the decision should involve a “mean-
ingful” human element. The reviewer must have the 
authority and capability to change the decision.50
Pursuant to the Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), and 
15(1)(h) of the GDPR, the data subject has a right 
to meaningful information about the existence of 
automated decisionmaking, the logic involved and 
the significance and envisaged consequences of such 
processing for the data subject. Furthermore, recital 
71 grants a right to an explanation of the reached 
decision. However, the controller has no obligation 
to precisely disclose how the utilized algorithm led to 
a particular decision in a specific case.51 Nonetheless, 
Article 15(1)(a) and (b) does grant the data subject 
the right to know what personal data are used for what 
purposes (see section ‘Right of access”). Through 
these safeguards, the right to obtain human interven-
tion does not function as an absolute barrier against 
decisions based on automated processing, but as a tool 
to control and monitor these decisions.
The right to obtain human intervention is 
also granted by Article 15 of the Data Protection 
Directive. Compared to the directive, The GDPR 
demands stricter measures to protect the data subject. 
Article 15(2)(a) of the Data Protection Directive 
merely demands that the data subject is allowed to 
present his point of view. Furthermore, the Articles 
10 and 11 of the Data Protection Directive do not 
impose a general duty to inform the data subject about 
the existence of and logic involved in the automatic 
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processing. Such an obligation exists only if the data 
subject actively exercises his right of access. Finally, 
the directive does not impose additional safeguards if 
the decision is based on the processing of special cat-
egories of personal data.
The Data Protection Directive does not con-
tain an exception for decisions that are based on the 
explicit consent of the data subject. For this reason, 
the GDPR also leads to a weakening of the protection 
of data subjects. The regulation allows controllers to 
make decisions based solely on automated processing 
in additional situations.
MODALITIES IN RELATION TO 
THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS 
OF THE DATA SUBJECT
The data subject can only benefit from his rights 
if the controller honours them in a manner that con-
tributes to the protection of and control over his per-
sonal data. For example, a data subject is not aided 
by a right of access if he receives only a response after 
a long time has passed or if he cannot understand 
the provided information. For this reason, the arti-
cles that grant the rights also stipulate modalities in 
relation to the exercise of the rights and the perfor-
mance of the corresponding obligations by the con-
troller. Furthermore, Article 12 of the GDPR gives 
several general rules. According to recital 59, these 
rules aim to facilitate the exercise of the rights. They 
relate, in particular, to the communication with the 
data subject (section “Information and communica-
tion”), the facilitation of the exercise of the rights 
(section “Facilitation”), the time period in which 
the controller should honour the rights (section 
“Terms”), and the fees for the exercise of the rights 
(section “Fees”).
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION
Pursuant to the Articles 13(2)(b) and (f), 14(2)
(c) and (g), and (3) and 21(4), the controller is obli-
gated to provide information about the various rights 
of the data subject at the time of the collection of the 
data, after obtaining them from another source or at 
the time of the first communication with the data 
subject. However, many data subjects will not read or 
benefit from this information at that time. After all, 
the personal data of a single person are processed by 
many controllers (section “The position of the data 
subject”). Furthermore, a data subject may only want 
to exercise his rights at a later time. For example, a 
data subject is more likely to use his right to be forgot-
ten after not using an online service for an extended 
period than at the time of the first use of the service. 
Still, the fact that he is regularly made aware of his 
rights, may make the data subject aware that he can 
also exercise them at other times and against other 
controllers.
Under the GDPR, the controller is obligated 
to again provide this information if the data subject 
exercises his right of access (see section “Right of 
access”). In this situation, the data subject is already 
actively taking control over the processing of his per-
sonal data. He may be more inclined to exercise his 
other rights. Moreover, the data subject can make this 
decision based on more concrete information about 
existing processing operations.
Articles 10(c) and 11(1)(c) of the Data Protection 
Directive only obligate the controller to inform the 
data subject about the right of access and the right to 
rectification. Moreover, this duty only exists insofar 
as this information is necessary to guarantee fair pro-
cessing in respect of the data subject. Next, except for 
information about the logic in the case of automated 
decisions, the controller is not obligated to again 
inform the data subject about his rights at the time of 
the exercise of his right of access.
Article 14(b) of the Data Protection Directive 
obligates the member states to take the necessary mea-
sures to ensure that data subjects are aware of the exis-
tence of the right to object against the processing of 
their personal data for purposes of direct marketing. In 
contrast to the other discussed provisions of the Data 
Protection Directive, Article 14(b) does not explic-
itly state that the controller should have an obligation. 
Naturally, a member state can fulfil its duty to inform 
the data subjects by forcing the controllers to provide 
the information.52 The directive does not contain an 
information duty in relation to the right to object to 
other processing operations.
Pursuant to Article 12(1) of the GDPR, the 
controller is obligated to communicate about the 
exercise of the rights of the data subject in a concise, 
transparent, intelligible, and easily accessible form, 
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using clear and plain language. This obligation allows 
a data subject to more easily monitor whether the 
controller adequately handles his requests. However, 
the controller is not required to make sure that every 
data subject is truly able to understand the provided 
information. Instead, Article 12 merely stipulates 
that he must take appropriate measures towards this 
goal.
The Data Protection Directive does not contain 
a general obligation to communicate clearly. Article 
12(a) merely states that if the data subject exercises 
his right of access, the communication of the pro-
cessed data should be in an intelligible form (sections 
“Right of access” and “Right to data portability”).
FACILITATION
Pursuant to Article 12(2) of the GDPR, a con-
troller is obligated to facilitate the exercise of the 
rights of the data subject. According to recital 59, 
he must provide mechanisms that allow data subjects 
to exercise their rights more easily. Furthermore, the 
controller should facilitate electronic requests. For 
example, he could offer an online template on his 
Web site.53 In any case, the controller cannot hide 
behind an unclear Web site and a hard to find email 
or postal address. The Data Protection Directive does 
not contain an obligation to facilitate the exercise of 
the rights of the data subject.
Article 12(2) of the GDPR strengthens the 
control by the data subjects. It forces the controller 
to actively enable the data subject to exercise their 
rights. However, the real effect of this obligation 
depends on its interpretation. After all, Article 12(2) 
does not prescribe any concrete measures.
TERMS
Pursuant to Article 12(3) of the GDPR, the 
controller must respond to a request concerning the 
exercise of the rights of the data subject without 
undue delay and in any event within 1 month of the 
receipt of the request. This period may be extended 
by 2 months if this is necessary due to the complex-
ity and the number of the requests. Article 12(3) is 
foremost about the period within which the controller 
should communicate with the data subject. However, 
the reaction should also provide information on the 
actions taken in response to the request. This suggests 
that the controller should also perform the obligations 
that correspond with the right within the provided 
term. With a few exceptions,54 the GDPR does not 
explicitly stipulate the length of these terms. If the 
controller does not take action on the request of the 
data subject, he must inform the data subject without 
delay and at the latest within 1 month pursuant to 
Article 12(4). This response should give the reasons 
for not taking actions and inform the data subject 
about his rights to lodge a complaint with a supervi-
sory authority and to seek a judicial remedy.55
Article 12(3) of the GDPR is a clear improve-
ment over the Data Protection Directive. Article 12 
of the directive merely states that the right of access 
should be honoured without excessive delay. The 
Data Protection Directive does not give any guidance 
about the terms for the response to a request concern-
ing the exercise of the other rights of the data subject.
FEES
Pursuant to Article 12(5) of the GDPR, a data 
subject can exercise his rights free of charge. A con-
troller can only charge a reasonable fee or refuse to 
act if the requests of the data subject are manifestly 
unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their 
repetitive character. This starting point does not exist 
under the Data Protection Directive. Article 12(a) 
of the directive only stipulates that the data subject 
should be able to exercise his right of access without 
excessive expense. Pursuant to Case C-486/12, X 
[2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:836, the controller cannot 
charge a fee that exceeds the cost of communicat-
ing such data. An objection to direct marketing is 
free of charge pursuant to Article 14(b) of the Data 
Protection Directive. The directive does not explic-
itly state whether a fee can be charged for the exercise 
of the other rights of the data subject.56
Although the fees for the exercise of the right of 
access must be modest, they can still create a signifi-
cant barrier to the exercise of the rights of the data 
subject. In practice, the right of access is a logical first 
step toward the exercise of the other rights (section 
“Right of access”). By allowing the controller to ask 
a fee for the exercise of the right of access, the other 
rights are also effectively locked behind this fee.
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Furthermore, even assuming that the fee is neg-
ligible in comparison to the material or immaterial 
benefits of ending or correcting an unlawful processing, 
it may still provide a barrier to actively asserting con-
trol. Even if the fee is nominal, a data subject may not 
be inclined to use his right of access proactively in 
order to monitor the processing of his personal data. 
Instead, he will only exercise his rights if he knows 
or has a clear indication that his data are processed 
unlawfully. A data subject may not be able to deter-
mine this (section “The position of the data subject”). 
The right of access is aimed at facilitating this assess-
ment. By making this right free of charge, the GDPR 
induces the data subject to more actively assert con-
trol over his data.
SYNTHESIS
The previous sections provide an overview of the 
rights of the data subject and the differences between 
the GDPR and the Data Protection Directive. The 
remainder of this article assesses the extent to which 
GDPR leads to a strengthening of the rights and con-
trol by the data subject. I will consecutively discuss 
the effects of the rights themselves (section “Scope 
and content”) and of the modalities in relation to 
their exercise (“Modalities”).
SCOPE AND CONTENT  
OF THE RIGHTS
The GDPR strengthens several rights. For 
example, it gives the data subject a right to addi-
tional information (section “Right of access”) and to 
have his data sent to another controller in a struc-
tured, commonly used, and machine-readable format 
(section “Right to data portability”). Furthermore, 
the GDPR grants additional safeguards in the case 
of automated processing (section “Right to obtain 
human intervention”). Finally, a data subject can 
exercise his rights in additional situations (sections 
“Right to be forgotten”, “Right to restriction of pro-
cessing” and “Right to object”). Although these 
changes can be important in specific situations, they 
are relatively limited compared to the total scope of 
the rights under both the Data Protection Directive 
and the GDPR. It is unlikely that they lead to 
a substantial strengthening of the control by the data 
subject.
Next, the GDPR clarifies and further develops 
the rights of the data subject.57 For example, it more 
clearly defines the situations in which a data subject 
can use his right to be forgotten. Furthermore, the 
GDPR explicitly states that a data subject can also 
complete incomplete data (section “Right to rectifi-
cation and completion”). Next, it clarifies the con-
sequences of the exercise of the right to restriction 
of processing (section “Right to restriction of pro-
cessing”). Finally, it provides more detailed rules in 
relation to the requirements for a successful objection 
to a processing that is based on Article 6(1)(e) or (f) 
of the GDPR. It clarifies that the successful exercise 
of this right can depend on a comparison of interests 
(section “Right to object”). These clarifications allow 
a data subject to more easily determine the scope and 
content of his rights. They lower the threshold to 
exercise them.
The more detailed text of the GDPR also clarifies 
the situations in which the rights of the data subject 
do not apply. For example, Article 17(3) lists several 
exceptions to the right to be forgotten that are not 
explicitly included in the Data Protection Directive. 
These new exceptions can weaken the position of the 
data subject. To illustrate, the prohibition of decisions 
that are solely based on automated processing does 
not apply under the GDPR if the processing is based 
on the explicit consent of the data subject (section 
“Right to obtain human intervention”).
MODALITIES
The Data Protection Directive hardly contains 
rules about the modalities for the exercise of the 
rights of the data subject. These matters are left to 
the national implementations. This means that the 
exact rules relating to the exercise of the rights of the 
data subject are different in each member state.58 By 
including them in the GDPR, the regulation strength-
ens the position of the data subjects in several ways.
First, it allows a data subject to use the exact same 
rights with the same practical modalities in all situa-
tions in which the GDPR applies. This can lower the 
threshold to exercise the rights against controllers in 
other (European) countries.59 The GDPR strengthens 
the rights of the data subject by harmonizing them.60
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Secondly, the GDPR provides and clarifies uni-
form modalities for the exercise of all the rights of 
the data subject. Again (see also section “Scope and 
content of the rights”), this allows a data subject to 
more easily understand them. It lowers the threshold 
to exercise the rights.
Finally, the content of the modalities also 
strengthens the position of the data subject. They 
ensure that a data subject is aware of his rights and 
understands them (section “Information and com-
munication”) and is able to exercise them (section 
“Facilitation”) for free (section “Fees”). Although the 
maximum term of one or 3 months can be quite long 
(section “Terms”), it at least provides a clear enforce-
able limit.
The effect of the rights of the data subject and 
the modalities in relation to their exercise ultimately 
depends on the controller. A controller who does 
not adequately handle personal data may also not be 
inclined to communicate clearly, facilitate the exer-
cise of the rights, or respond within 1 month.61 This 
could prevent a data subject from becoming aware of 
his rights or exercising them. This is a problematic 
result. The rights and control by the data subject are 
a tool. They are ultimately meant to strengthen the 
protection of personal data (section “Introduction”). 
Because the accessibility depends on the controller, 
the rights may not be practically available in the situ-
ations in which they are most needed.
The extent to which the rights strengthen the 
control by the data subject partly depends on the 
enforcement of the modalities in relation to the exer-
cise of the rights. However, a data subject does not 
have a stand-alone interest in the application of these 
rules. They do not care about information about or 
the facilitation of the rights unless they are planning 
to exercise them. For this reason, the modalities are 
not likely to be enforced by individual data subjects. 
Instead, this will have to be done by supervisory 
authorities or non-governmental organisations.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I answer the following research 
questions: What are the rights of the data subject under 
the GDPR? To what extent do these rights strengthen 
the control over the processing of his personal data? The 
sections “Right of access” through “Right to obtain 
human intervention” present an overview of the rights 
of the data subject and the differences between the 
GDPR and the Data Protection Directive. Although 
the GDPR does not significantly expand the rights, it 
does provide clarity about their legal effects and the 
exact criteria for their exercise (section “Scope and 
content of the rights”). Furthermore, the regulation 
gives more detailed rules in relation to the exercise 
of the rights and the performance of the correspond-
ing obligations by the controller (section “Modalities 
in relation to the exercise of the rights of the data 
subject”). These modalities lower the threshold for 
the data subject. They make it easier for him to exer-
cise his rights by clarifying the process and removing 
barriers (section “Modalities”). For these reasons, the 
GDPR considerably strengthens the rights of the data 
subject.
At the same time, this enhancement only mar-
ginally alleviates his disadvantaged position. The per-
sonal data of a single data subject will still be processed 
by many controllers and in many different ways. The 
GDPR does not grant him any tools to practically 
maintain an overview of these controllers and pro-
cessing operations. For example, the option to erase 
personal data that were collected when he was a child 
(section “Right to be forgotten”) does not enable 
the data subject to realize who has his data after he 
becomes an adult. Similarly, the exact consequences 
of individual processing operations will remain hard 
to establish. In many situations, the GDPR will not in 
itself create a stimulus to exercise the rights of the data 
subject (section “the position of the data subject”).
For these reasons, the strengthening of the con-
trol by the data subject is limited. The GDPR allows a 
data subject to more easily exercise his rights if there 
is a clear indication that his data are not adequately 
protected. The rights of the data subject, however, do 
not induce or permit him to proactively and substan-
tially assert control over the processing of his personal 
data.62 As long as the data subject remains in a disad-
vantaged position, his role will continue to be correct-
ing instead of controlling.
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